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Reviewed by Douglas J. Caldwell· and David A. Wirth" 
INTRODUCTION 
The trade-and-environment controversy continues to simmer, with 
the pot boiling over at fairly frequent intervals. For example, the first 
dispute settlement panel convened under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has just concluded that the treatment of 
foreign refiners in a federal regulation designed to protect air quality 
through the use of reformulated gasoline contravenes the United States' 
obligations under WTO rules.! A recent amendment to the Basel Con-
vention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal that would ban exports of hazardous wastes 
from industrialized to developing countries has provoked substantial 
• Deputy Director, Trade, Health, and Environment Program, Community Nutrition 
Institute, Washington, D.C. 
*. Director, Trade, Health, and Environment Program, Community Nutrition Institute, 
Washington, D.C.; Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. 
This work was supported by grants from the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, the Creswell Foundation, and the Frances Lewis Law Center of Washington 
and Lee University. 
1. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. 
WTIDS2JR (Jan. 17, 1996). 
563 
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controversy.2 The executive branch recently announced that it will 
challenge, in the WTO, the European Union's (EU's) ban on meat pro-
duced from animals treated with growth hormones as a non-tariff barrier 
to trade.3 
The four books examined in this review reflect the intense interest 
in the trade-and-environment connection over 'the past several years. The 
trade-and-environment debate has a number of unique features that have 
attracted these authors and others. Both trade and environmental policies 
are intended to improve human welfare. With no "black hats," the trade-
and-environment nexus presents more nuances than the popular para-
digm of free trader versus self-serving protectionist or the familiar 
model of environmentalist pitted against greedy polluters. The observa-
tion that the ongoing public dialogue over trade and the environment 
involves a conflict of cultures has already become' a cliche. But the 
readily discernible clash between international regimes raises intellectual 
questions of sufficient sophistication to attract writers as distinguished as 
the authors of each of these books. 
Although these authors'represent a'variety of disciplines, all of 
them, consistent with' the demands of the subject matter, recognize' the 
need to adopt an integrated approach that spans narrowly defined spe-
cialties. Daniel Esty, a lawyer and former high-ranking official in the 
Environmental Protection Agency during the Bush administration, 
consciously introduces !in economic perspective. This book is very 
thorough, surveying every nook and cranny' of the trade-and-environ-
ment landscape. The author purposely adopts a policy-based and 
reformist approach. Each of the analytical chapters in the latter portion 
of the book concludes with a multiplicity of micro- and macro-level 
recommendations for policy change. 
C. Ford Runge, an economist, wrote his work based on irisights 
gained as co-director of the Trade and Environment Study Group orga-
nized under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations during 1992 
and 1993. Adopting an approach similar to Esty, Runge synthesizes eco-
nomic, environmental, and legal analysis in his text. By comparison with 
the Esty book, this project is less an attempt at a prescriptive solution, 
and more an attempt to articulate an overarching analytical framework for 
reconciling conflicts between environmental and international trade 
policies. Where Esty's book reads like testimony to a congressional 
2. See, e.g., Ban on Waste Exports Outside OEeD Pushed Through Basel Treaty Meet-
ing, 18 InCI Env't Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 4, 1995). 
3. Statement of Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative (Jan. II, 
1996) (on file with Michigan Journal of International Law). 
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committee, Runge's effort is more of a "thought experiment" at a lower 
level of detail and somewhat higher level of generality. 
David Vogel, approaching his project from the perspective of a 
political scientist, likewise grapples with the legal, environmental, and 
economic features characteristic of the field. In the author's own words, 
the main theoret.ical contribution of this work is a "comparative study of 
regulatory policy to that of international political economy.,,4 The goal 
of the book. is to demonstrateUhow trade liberalization and agreements 
to promote it, rather than undermining effective regulatory standards, 
have often served to strengthen them.,,5 This author meticulously sur-
veys the historical and factual' detail in the field and is particularly 
scrupulous in canvassing all points of view. The book contains case 
studies of the EU, including the seminal Cassis de Dijon case, the 1947 
General Agreement.on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),6 the so-called "tuna-
dolphin" dispute, and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFT A). This book demonstrates the proposition that one can never be 
entirely free of a particular disciplinary focus. Readers approaching the 
material from a legal perspective will find disconcerting the author's 
p~actice of citing secondary sources, such- as newspaper stories, as 
authority for governmental actions . 
. James Cameron; Paul Demaret, and Damien Geradin, the editors ,of 
the two-volume work Trade and the Environment: The Search for 
Balance, have assembled an impressive array of authors and documents 
covering a wide scope in the trade-and-environment field. In addition to 
contributions from each of the editors, the first volume contains essays 
from leading GATT legal scholars (John Jackson, Ernst-Ulrich 
Peters mann), economists (Edward Barbier, David Pearce),law professors 
in Europe and the United States (Daniel Esty, Thomas Schoenbaum, 
Richard Stewart, and John Usher), and officials from international 
institutions such as the EU and the European Bank ~or Reconstruction 
and Development (Christoph Bail, Luc Gyseleri, and Alke Schmidt). The 
remaining contributions in this nineteen-essay volume are written by 
several legal associates at Cameron's home institution, the British-based 
Foundation for International Law and Development (FIELD). The very 
useful second volume is a documentary supplement containing several 
of the most important primary sources relevant to'this area of study. The 
4. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING Up: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A 
GLOBAL EcONOMY 1 (1995). 
5. [d. at 3. 
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 (Jan. 12, 1948) [hereinafter GATT 1947]. 
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collection includes significant GATT and NAFTA documents, texts of 
selected international environmental agreements, and a variety of EU 
and United States court decisions. 
. The first volume of this set explores the trade-and-environment 
relationship from the experiences within the GATT (now WTO), the 
EU, the United States, and the NAFTA. The first section, "Trade and 
the Environment in the GATT Context," suffers somewhat from the 
tendency of many of the authors to recycle their views from previous 
efforts and an unnecessarily protracted analysis and criticism of the 
1991 tuna-dolphin dispute. Still, the careful reader is rewarded with 
several interesting perspectives on the trade-and-environment policy 
linkage. In particular, the second section of the volume, "Trade and the 
Environment in the European Community Context," provides a welcome 
European viewpoint of these issues that is too often neglected in North 
America. Regrettably, with a few exceptions, little effort is made to 
compare the approaches taken in the GATT, the NAFTA, the EU, and 
the United States with one another. Instead, each region or agreement's 
experience is often presented in isolation, a gap that might have been 
closed through a somewhat more active posture on the part of the edi-
tors. As it is, an intriguing opportunity to explore the potential transfer-
ability of lessons learned in each regime's trade-and-environment prac-
tice is inadequately pursued or missed entirely. The volume betrays 
evidence of hasty editing, and there is no index. 
Not surprisingly, there is considerable common ground among these 
works. Each contains thoughtful reflections on the ongoing trade-and-
environment dialogue. All traverse ground that is now reasonably well-
trodden and clearly defined from the point of view of analytical dis-
course and real-world policy making: public participation in trade agree-
ment dispute resolution processes, the interaction of trade-based regimes 
with multilateral environmental agreements, and the like. Instead of 
revisiting these themes, this review attempts to evaluate the contribu-
tions of these four books on a number of the major questions now 
outstanding in the trade-and-environment dialogue: (1) the potential 
abuse of environmental regulations for protectionist purposes; (2) 
unilateralism versus multilateralism in the use of trade measures to 
achieve environmental goals; (3) the appropriate linkages, if any, be-
tween the establishment of environmental and international trade poli-
cies; (4) institutional questions on the international level; and (5) an 
overarching perspective on the trade-and-environment debate. 
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I. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND UNILATERAL ACTIONS 
One of the issues that has bedeviled many of those working in the 
trade-and-environment area is how to distinguish a legitimate environ-
mental or public health measure from protectionism wrapped in envi-
ronmental garb. While this question has attracted the attention of many, 
the extent of the problem is still far from clear. For instance, at the time 
of the negotiation of the NAFfA,7 there appear to have been no cases in 
which any of the three NAFf A countries had abused measures designed 
to protect human health in a way that could plausibly be characterized 
as a non-tariff barrier to trade. 
The authors adopt a variety of approaches to this issue, one of the 
core dilemmas of the trade-and-environment problem. The emphasis 
among these writers is on articulating tests for distinguishing legitimate 
environmental measures from protectionism masquerading as environ-
mental regulation. As a general matter, these efforts, all of which are 
unsatisfying to some degree, demonstrate the complexity of crafting 
generic rules to address a' potentially enormous variety of possible cases. 
Esty asserts the need 'to' "rebalance" GATT IWTO rules "to give 
greater deference to the judgments of national decision makers about 
environmental goals and the means chosen to pursue them."s He propos-
es' a three-part test, the first prong of which would measure intent and 
effect. One of the obvious problems with such an approach is that 
intent, particularly in a democracy, is not necessarily unitary but often 
multifarious. The motivation for a national measure may be both protec-
tionist and legitimately environmental, and various legislators may differ 
in their individual motivations.9 David Pearce, in his contribution to 
Trade and the Environment, underscores this crucial point by noting that 
most environmental measures will contain some form of incidental 
"protectionist" element. "Deciding when protection or conservation is 
the primary motive .could be very difficult."to 
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993). 
8. DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 
l35 (1994). 
9. See, e.g., United States-Canada Bilateral Panel, In the ~atter of Lobsters From 
Canada, Panel No. USA 89-1807-01, paras. 9.7.1-9.7.3, 9.9.1 (May 25, 1990) (minority report 
reaching application of Article XX(g), incorporated by reference into Article 1201 of United 
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, concluding that challenged measure was at least in part 
trade-protective, and therefore not "primarily aimed at conservation" as required by Article 
XX(g», available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Uscfta File. 
10. David Pearce, The Greening of the GATT: Some Economic Considerations, in 1 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 20, 28 (James Cameron et al. 
eds., 1994) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. 
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Esty's second prong is environmental legitimacy. In this section he 
establishes a hierarchy that distinguishes among different cases, de-
pending on the locus of the harm. This question of the use of trade 
restrictions to protect the environment outside of a state's jurisdiction is 
among the most contentious in the trade-and-environment. relationship. 
In descending order of urgency, Esty would first array effects purely 
within a country's own jurisdiction, and then transboundary harm origi-
nating from abroad but causing harm domestically. Impacts on the 
global commons beyond the reach of national jurisdiction would be next 
in order of importance, and finally, injuries purely within a foreign 
country's jurisdiction. II 
While this ranking might have some intuitive appeal, it does not 
necessarily withstand closer scrutiny. For example, effects. on the global 
commons may be a more compelling case for trade measures than are 
trans boundary harms. In the latter case, all manner of bilateral suasion 
not relying on trade measures, such as diplomatic communications, are 
available to affect the behavior of the state from which the harm origi-
nates, and the "victim" state has every motivation to make ample use of 
those existing channels. By contrast, injuries to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction are in many ways "orphan" problems, involving perhaps as· 
much or more environmental harm, but often lacking a directly affected 
constituency that can effectively generate the political will for change. 
In all these areas, Esty acknowledges the need for scientific under-
pinnings to trade measures to prevent environmental harm. However, 
adjudicating scientific controversies in a forum such as a WTO dispute 
settlement panel is fraught with irreducible difficulties. 12 In the absence 
of a clear scientific justification, Esty advocates deference to social 
value choices, which he labels "moral judgments," hut only those that 
"are widely shared, as measured by whether the ethical position at issue 
is reflected in an international agreement.',,13 
As his last prong, Esty urges the adoption of a criterion based on a 
measure of unjustified trade disruption. This proposal would consciously 
relax the "necessary" test found in Article XX(b) of the GATT, one of 
the principal avenues for justifying an environmental measure, and the 
particularly rigorous interpretation espoused by some GAIT panels that 
11. Other writers in this field have adopted a similar matrix for analyzing these situa-
tions. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the 
Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1351-61 (1992). 
12. See, e.g., David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA 
Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817 (1994). 
13. EsTY, supra note 8, at 120. 
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turns on the trade effect of the measure considered. t4 Instead, Esty 
would substitute a requirement similar to the "proportionality" standard 
found in EU law. But, as Damien Geradin t5 and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmannt6 point out in Trade and the Environment, this approach, 
like many balancing tests, can be quite subjective in practical applica-
tion. It may also elude attempts at clarification to a high level of pre-
dictability and analytical rigor.t7 Interestingly, Peters mann is convinced 
that the EU principle of proportionality places far more rigorous con-
straints on national environmental regulatory powers than the 
GATTIWTO regime does. tS 
Where Esty advises a total rethinking of the non-tariff barrier prob-
lem, Runge counsels a closer look at the utility of those approaches that 
have already been applied. In particular, he endorses the approach of a 
panel report produced under the auspices of the United States-Camida 
bilateral free trade agreement (CFfA),t9 a precursor to NAFfA, in a 
dispute settlement proceeding that otherwise has received limited atten-
tion. At issue were Canadian regulations requiring that all commercial 
harvests of roe herring and five species of salmon caught in Canadian 
waters, including those intended for export from Canada, be off-loaded 
or "landed" in Canadian territory. The panel concluded that the effect of 
14. E.g., Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
GATT Doc. No. DSIOIR, paras. 74-81 (Nov. 7, 1990) (import restrictions not justified by 
Article XX(b) in light of availability of GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent mea-
sures), in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECT-
ED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 200, 223-26 (37th Supp. 1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 
1122, 1137-39 (1991); cf United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverag-
es, GATT Doc. No. DS23/R, paras. 5.41-43, 5.52 (June 19, 1992) (measures relating to 
import of beer are not the least trade-restrictive and therefore not "necessary" within meaning 
of Article XX(d), which exempts "measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with" GATT), in BISD 206, 282-83, 287-88 (39th 
Supp. 1993); United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc. U6439, 
paras. 5.25-5.35 (Nov. 7, 1989) (availability of GATT-consistent or less GATT-inconsistent 
alternaiives implies that challenged measures are not "necessary" under Article XX(d». in 
BISD 345, 392-96 (36th Supp. 1990). 
15. Damien Geradin, Balancing Free Trade and Environmental Protection - The Inter-
play Between the European Court of Justice and the Community Legislator, in I TRADE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 204, 213. 
16. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade and Environmental Protection: The Practice of 
GATT and the European Community Compared, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra 
note 10, at 147, 176. 
17. See, e.g., Case 302186, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 4632, I 
C.M.L.R. 619, 632 (1989) (concluding that Danish recycling scheme establishing numerical 
limitation on beverages that could be sold in unapproved containers was disproportionate to 
the environmental objective and therefore inconsistent with Treaty of Rome). 
18. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 175. 
19. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 
102 Stat. 1851,27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA]. 
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the "landing" requirement constituted an impermissible export restriction 
contrary to the GATT, the relevant provisions of which were incorporat-
ed by reference into the bilateral agreement. 20 
By comparison with Esty's proposed approach, which would "pre-
sume the legitimacy of any environmental standards[,]"21 the panel in 
this dispute applied a highly intrusive and demanding slate of criteria 
that can only be described as overtly hostile to regulation of environ-
mental problems and natural resources generally. For one, the panel read 
into the GATT a new requirement not found in the text of that instru-
ment that would require a balancing of the costs and benefits of the 
challenged measure, taking into account the regulatory burdens to for-
eign commercial interests. Consequently, a panel must determine 
"whether the government would have been prepared to adopt that mea-
sure if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of the measure.'t22 
Certainly one can appreciate the panel's sensitivity to the problem of 
shifting regulatory burdens to foreign interests that are not represented 
in the political process through which those burdens were imposed. But 
a cost-benefit test of the sort articulated by this panel has been expressly 
rejected in much environmental regulation, including a great deal of 
federal legislation in the United States, whose legitimacy from a trade 
perspective has never been challenged. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
the panel's approach in this report could result in overlaying a cost-
benefit criterion on all environmental requirements with trade effects -
clearly an excessively sweeping and blunt-edged instrument. 
Similarly, the CFTA Salmon and Herring panel's treatment of sci-
entific questions, an issue identified by Esty and others as one of major 
importance, is quite troubling. Apparently without the aid of any expert 
advice other than that available among the panelists, the panel concluded 
that sampling no more than eighty to ninety percent of the catch, and 
not 100 percent as required by the Canadian measure, would be suffi-
cient to achieve its conservation purposes.23 With respect to the question 
of scientific uncertainty, the panel opined that "it is never easy to justify 
20. United States-Canada Binational Panel, hi the Matter of Canada's Landing Require-
ment for Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring, Panel No. CDA 89-1807-01, para. 6.13 (Oct. 16, 
1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Uscfta File [hereinafter Salmon & Herring panel). 
21. EsTY, supra note 8, at 117. 
22. Salmon & Herring panel, supra note 20, para. 7.09; cf para. 7.38 ("[T]he conserva-
tion benefits and other advantages that would have been derived from a landing requirement 
applicable to 100% of the salmon and herring catch would not have justified its adoption as 
a conservation measure."). 
23. Jd. paras. 7.34, 7.40. 
HeinOnline -- 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 571 1995-1996
Spring 1996] Trade and the Environment 571 
imposing tangible burdens for the purpose of avoiding uncertain risks.,,24 
Overall, this report demonstrates little, if any, deference to the resolution 
of scientific questions by national regulatory authorities25 and invites 
reexamination of scientific questions before panels in a manner that 
would be unthinkable in a proceeding for judicial review on the domes-
tic level. 
The reader can sympathize with Runge's desire for a yardstick to 
measure environmental regulations alleged to be non-tariff barriers that 
is both predictable and a "synthesis of law, economics, and environ-
mental perspectives.,,26 The result in the CFTA Salmon and Herring 
dispute might also have been "correct" in that the measure at issue was 
protectionist in intent and effect. However, the larger implications of the 
analytical approach adopted by that panel can hardly be regarded as 
anything but a source for concern: a highly flawed "synthesis" that gives 
grossly excessive weight to economic factors and scientific certainty and 
significantly insufficient deference to the determinations of national 
decisionmakers. Often the most thoughtful of these writers, Runge 
explicitly identifies the need to give due weight to an expressly environ-
mental perspective in the trade-and-environment discourse.27 Nonethe-
less, the reader is left wondering whether this author fully appreciates 
the long-term consequences of his endorsement of the analytical ap-
proach adopted by the panel in the CFTA Salmon and Herring dispute. 
Although David Vogel's "primary focus is on the relationship 
between trade agreements, treaties, and conflicts and regulatory stan-
dards,'t2B his approach is more descriptive than prescriptive; this author 
does not offer detailed policy recommendations on a level of detail 
similar to those of Esty and Runge. Vogel's principal contribution to the 
discussion in this area directly addresses the concern that "legitimate" 
24. [d. para. 7.37. 
25. See. e.g., Wirth, supra note 12, at 845 (criticizing CFTA Salmon and Herring panel 
report for 
its intrusive review of the exercise of expert scientific judgement by national 
regulatory authorities; its lack of deference to science-based decisions of technical-
ly-oriented policy makers; its willingness to substitute the panel's own judgment 
for the numerical determinations of governmental experts based on the panel's own 
reading of scientific texts; and its relatively limited appreciation of the significance 
of scientific uncertainty in the regulatory process, which leads to an adjudicatory 
review that is exactly contrary to that prescribed by precautionary approaches.). 
26. C. FORD RUNGE ET AL., FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 80 (1994). 
27. [d. at 31-33. 
28. VOGEL, supra note 4, at ix. 
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environmental constituencies may end up associated, perhaps unwitting-
ly, with protectionist interests. The danger from a trade perspective 
inherent in such alliances amounts to an article of faith among support-
ers of trade liberalization.29 
Vogel, applying the label "Baptist-bootlegger coalitions[,]" 
analogizes the situation to "the politics of prohibition in the United 
States: political support for keeping certain southern counties 'dry' has 
come from both Baptists, who favor prohibition on moral grounds, and 
bootleggers, whose business depends on keeping alcohol sales illegal.,,30 
Quite refreshingly and entirely contrary to the received wisdom, Vogel 
does not condemn these unholy relationships from a normative or 
evaluative point of view. Rather, he acknowledges, at least on this 
occasion, that such a convergence of interests is an essential element of 
the political and policy engine in which one state adopts a leading role. 
Baptist-bootlegger coalitions, he asserts, can operate as a counterweight 
to the least-common-denominator effect on national regulatory standards 
often cited as a concern about free trade agreements. At least in some 
situations, he concludes, "Baptist-bootlegger coalitions can serve to 
advance the legitimate interests of both Baptists and bootleggers.'031 
David Pearce, in his essay in the multiple-author Trade and the 
Environment, takes on the politically charged distinction between prod-
ucts, which if contaminated or substandard may be subject to trade 
measures under GATTIWTO rules, and the process by which those 
products are produced, which is generally thought to be beyond the 
reach of import restrictions at the national level. This was one of the 
most contentious points in the GATT's so-called "tuna-dolphin" panel 
report, which concluded that a United States ban on the import of tuna 
caught in a manner that endangers dolphins is contrary to GATT rules.32 
29. See, e.g., I CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE '90-'91, at 19-39 (1992) (GATT publication asserting that 
"[t]here is much evidence which points to a serious risk of environmental issues and concerns 
being exploited by protectionists for their own benefit." [d. at 21.). 
30. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 20. 
31. [d. at 261. 
32. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS21/R (1991), 
in BISD ISS (39th Supp. 1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna 
Dolphin [ Panel Report]. Mexico did not seek the adoption of this report at the time of its 
release, and the GATT Council rejected a request by the EU to adopt the report. The EU and 
the Netherlands subsequently initiated their own challenge to the secondary import ban, which 
is designed to discourage "tuna laundering" by intermediary nations which purchase yellowfin 
tuna abroad and export it to the United States. This panel report, like the first, found that the 
secondary import prohibition is inconsistent with the United States' obligations pursuant to 
the GATT. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. No. DS29/R (June 
1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Gattpd File (1994). 
Neither report was adopted by. the GATT Council, which ceased to exist as of the end of 
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In criticizing this report, Pearce emphasizes that, from an economic per-
spective, the GATT distinction between environmental damage arising 
from the product and damage arising from its method of production is 
an artificial one. Pearce points out that both the product and the method 
of production may respectively cause environmental damage in the 
exporting country and welfare loss in the importing country.33 
Henry Thaggert, in an insightful intellectual twist on this well-worn 
topic, convincingly argues that the GATTIWTO regime currently allows 
distinctions in .products based on the methods by which they are pro-
duced, specifically in the application of indirect taxes and subsequent 
border tax adjustments. He notes that there is no explicit definition of 
"like product" in the GATT and that there is ample evidence in the 
drafting history to suggest that "otherwise like products may be deemed 
'unlike' based upon differences in production[.],,34 Thaggert then sug-
gests that the indirect tax precedent indicates that a process-based regu-
lation ,undertaken in the name of environmental protection should be 
acceptable in the GATTIWTO regime so long as that measure does not 
afford protection to domestic production. Indeed, many of the authors 
represented in Trade and the Environment emphasize that GATTIWTO 
dispute settlement panels examining environmental trade measures 
should worry less about strictly interpreting the definition of "like 
product" and should concentrate instead on whether the trade restriction 
inquestiori is applied in a discriminatory. manner that favors domestic 
products. Esty simiiarly advocates a relaxation, if not outright abandon-
ment, of the product-process distinction.35 The level of consensus among 
these authors on this. important question appears to be sufficiently 
widespread that policyrriakers might well take note. 
Unilateralism versus multilateralism represents another, albeit relat-
ed, line of cleavage in the trade-and-environment colloquy. As pointed 
out by John Jackson in his essay in Trade and the Environment, propo-
nents of free trade fear undermining a liberalized international trading 
system through the imposition of unilateral standards on foreign societ-
ies potentially resulting in a crazy quilt of trade-based restrictions 
1995. Hence, these two reports do not represent authoritative interpretations of GAITIWTO 
oqligations by the contracting parties to the GAIT: See.WiIliam J. Davey, Dispute Settlement 
in GAIT, II FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 94 (1987). 
33. Pearce, supra note 10, at 29. 
34. Henry L. Thaggert, A Closer Look at the Tuna-Dolphin Case: "Like Products" and 
"Extrajurisdictionality" in the Trade and Environment Context, in f TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 69, 72. . , 
35. EsTY, supra note 8, at 134. 
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around the globe.36 If the past is any guide, unilateral measures are far 
more likely to inspire GATTIWTO dispute settlement challenges than 
multilateral environmental protection efforts. Indeed, the first tuna-
dolphin report expressly articulated a preference for multilateral over 
unilateral measures,37 and no national measure taken pursuant to a 
multilateral environmental agreement has ever been challenged in the 
GATT or WTO. 
These books also demonstrate that what one person perceives as 
unilateralism can well be interpreted as leadership by another. As Esty 
correctly notes, "The intrinsic difficulty of multilateral decision making 
and the lack of existing institutional structures for effective international 
environmental policy making ... makes unilateral action a necessary, if 
unfortunate, policy option in some circumstances.,,38 In short, the 
GATTIWTO regime provides a skewed, one-sided response to the 
current dilemma in most multilateral negotiations: how to overcome the 
downward drag of consensus-based processes in which the natural 
momentum inevitably tends toward least-common-denominator results. 
The authors represented in Trade and the Environment, many of whom 
react specifically to the issues identified in the first tuna-dolphin panel 
report, are perhaps representative of current thought in this area. In a 
welcome development, a majority of those contributors see a need for 
greater receptivity on the part of the GATTIWTO regime to unilateral 
measures to protect resources of the global commons. James Cameron 
and Zen Makuch emphasize that "[t]he importance of multilateral inter-
national agreements should not . . . obscure the value of unilateral or 
bilateral action.,,39 
As Henry Thaggert writes, "The fact that a measure is unilaterally 
executed should not in itself be the grounds for invalidating it.,,40 In 
Thaggert's view, a state of import that has suffered actual injury to its 
domestic environment, the global commons, or a migratory species that 
passes through its jurisdiction, and that has imposed certain restrictions 
on its own domestic producers of a like good contributing to the envi-
ronmental damage, should be permitted by GATTIWTO rules to ban 
36. John H. Jackson, Greening the GAIT: Trade Rules and Environmental Policy, in 1 
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 39, 44. 
37. Tuna Dolphin I Panel Report, supra note 32, at para. 5.28, BlSO at 199-200, 30 
I.L.M. at 1620. 
38. EsTY, supra note 8, at 144. 
39. James Cameron & Zen Makuch, Implementation of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: International Trade Law Implications, in 1 TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 116, 120. 
40. Thaggert, supra note 34, at 82. 
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import of the product if the process by which the product is produced 
contributes to the same damage regulated by the state of import. 
Thaggert attaches a useful appendix to his article that proposes the 
development of a framework for allowing the imposition of product-
based distinctions beyond national borders. In like manner, Demaret, in 
one of his essays in Trade and the Environment, supports the use of 
trade restrictions to protect the global commons, allowing exceptional 
trade measures for species on the verge of extinction, even in the ab-
sence of international cooperation.41 Significantly, Peters mann sees few 
limitations in GA TTIWTO rules on "extra jurisdictional" trade restric-
tions if foreign production and exports cause transboundary pollution or 
injury to the global commons.42 As with the non-tariff barrier issue, the 
scope of the "problem" is less than clear. Unilateral measures to protect 
resources outside a state's jurisdiction appear to have been rarely, if 
ever, directed at unrelated products except in situations closely tied to 
the purpose of a multilateral environmental agreement. But somewhat 
soberingly, Christoph Bail notes that the European Commission contin-
ues to support the position that a country should not unilaterally restrict 
imports on environmental grounds if the damage does not have an 
impact in that state's territory.43 In a captivating permutation on the 
multilateral/unilateral duality, Cameron and Makuch speculate on the use 
of trade measures, particularly carbon dioxide or energy taxes, in the 
context of the U.N. Climate Change Convention.44 This is a very impor-
tant contribution because this agreement, unlike others that have as-
sumed importance in the trade-and-environment discourse, does not ex-
pressly authorize trade-based environmental measures. 
II. LINKAGES AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
Throughout these works, a tug-of-war dynamic between trade reali-
ties and environmental concerns is readily discernible. Competing, but 
constant, themes alternately strengthen and sever the trade-and-environ-
ment connection. Runge's work is a good example of the ebb and flow 
of these motifs. He argues for bifurcation in policy tools: "trade targets 
41. Paul Demaret, TREMs. Multilateralism. Unilateralism and the GATT, in I TRADE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 52, 64. 
42. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 159. 
43. Christoph Bail, The Promotion of Policy Coherence on Trade and Environment: A 
Role for the European Community, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 
333,335. 
44. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY 
Doc. No. 38, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 31 I.L.M. 851 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Climate 
Change Convention]. 
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should be matched with trade instruments, and environmental targets 
with. environmental instruments."4s On the other hand, Runge repeatedly 
emphasizes the need for tightened environmental regulation to offset the 
deregulatory effect of trade liberalization.46 But the vehicle for achieving 
this goal, at least at the international lev.el,. would not be an institutional 
structure to address .the connection between trade and environment,' but 
a new "World Environmen~al Organization" (WEO), portrayed as a 
vigorous multilateral institution whose mandate is confined to theenvi-
ronment. In a return to the theme of linkage,' Runge acknowledges that 
trade agreements are inherently deals in which market access is provided 
on a consensual basis through the vehicle of a trade agreement. Runge 
then emphasizes that there is no reason why the price of market access 
should not be improved environmental standards and performance.47 
These themes are complementary, not mut':lally exclusive. Far from 
representing any confusion on the part of this author or others, each of 
these strains, appropriately understood, has Ii place in a comprehensive 
view of the trade-and-environment problem. 
It is clear that there is a significant disparity in the primary institu-
tional fora on the international level in which trade· and environmental 
matters are considered. Most environmental problems have been treated 
on the international level in a segmented, compartmentalized manner. 
International environmental agreements are largely separate and unco-
ordinated attempts to deal with discrete problems like protection of the 
stratospheric ozone layer,48 conservation of endangered species,49 and 
environmental harm from international shipment~ of hazardous wastes,SO 
to name three of the areas that have attracted the most attention in a 
trade context. Dispute settlement and, enforcement provisions in most 
multilateral environmental agreements are weak. 
Despite the great activity, in drafting new international environmental 
treaties in recent years, the field of international environmental law has 
45. RUNGE ET AL .• supra note 26. at 29. 
46. Id. at 52. 
47. Id. at 27. 
48. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Sept. 16. 1987. 
S. TREATY Doc. No. 10. l00th Cong .• 1st Sess. (1987). 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (adjusted and 
amended June 29. 1990. S. TREATY Doc.' No.4. 102d Cong .• 1st Sess. (1991). 30 I.L.M. 539 
(1991). and Nov. 25. 1992. S. TREATY Doc. No.9. 103d Cong .• 1st Sess. (1993). 32I.L.M. 
875 (1993». 
49. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. Mar. 3. 1973. 27 
V.S.T. 1087. 993 V.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. 
50. See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal. Mar. 22. 1989. S. TREATY Doc. No.5. 102d Cong .• 1st Sess. 
(1991).28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention]. 
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not been accompanied by a commensurate level of institutional growth. 
The result has been a lack of coordination and a high degree of frag-
mentation. Only one international organization, the United Nations Envi-
ronment Program (UNEP) , has a mission that is exclusively environ-
mentaL Numerous' other .international organizations established for a 
variety of other purposes have also played' significant roles in interna-
tional environmental challenges. Some of these organizations include the 
International Maritime Organization (lMO), under whose auspices a 
number of marine pollution agreements have been negotiated; the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which has been the vehicle 
for negotiating a number of important agreements on traditional air 
pollution issues; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD), which in the past.has been a principal forum for dis-
cussing trans boundary pollution and is now working on the trade-and-
environment nexus; and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), which has played a major role in work on pesticides at the 
international level. The negotiation of the U.N. Climate Change Con-
vention adopted in 1992 was entrusted to another new body, the Inter-
governmental Negotiating Committee. (INC). Even more institutional 
fragmentation has taken place as the secretariats for environmental 
agreements have increasingly acquired an independent character and 
have located far from one another. 
In contrast, the WTO now serves as a central focal point in the trade 
arena with broad-gauge rule-making authority potentially covering the 
entire range of trade-related matters, including environmental standards, 
intellectual property, and. agricultural subsidies. Bilateral or regional 
trade. agreements, such as' NAFT A, generally rely on fundamental 
GATTIWTO principles and are consciously structured to be consistent 
with the global regime. The GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms, 
which were already quite effective by comparison with those in most 
multilateral environmental agreements, were further strengthened by the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the creation of 
the WTO .. Peters mann is particularly perceptive in recognizing these 
significant asymmetries between the international trade and environmen-
tal regimes.51 
Both Runge and Esty strongly and correctly emphasize the need for 
more effective environmental rule-making mechanisms on the interna-
tional level. Esty's "Global Environmental Organization" .(GEO) is 
similar to the WEO proposed by Runge. The central need, as both 
.:. . . 
51. Petersmann. supra note 16. at 147-48. 
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recognize, is to overcome the inertial rigidity of an international system 
based on consent and consensus.52 The core dilemma is to determine the 
attributes of this new organizatiQn which, presumably, will respond 
effectively to the problems of the past. Runge succeeds somewhat better 
than Esty at identifying institutional rules and mechanisms that might 
provide some incremental improvements. In the end, both are consider-
ably less than satisfying, which is perhaps inevitable. Even the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO), whose institutional structures still seem 
innovative by today's standards, has been only partially successful in 
achieving the kind of results Runge and Esty anticipate. It is neither 
reasonable nor necessarily desirable to advocate the formation of a 
global environmental legislature. Ultimately, as Vogel might opine, the 
determinative factor may well be political will and not institutional 
mechanisms. As Vogel states in his last sentence, perhaps there is no 
escaping that "[iJn the final analysis, the impact of trade and trade 
agreements on regulatory standards is determined by the interaction of 
domestic and international politics.,,53 
Consequently, there is likely to be a continuing need not only to 
emphasize the efficacy of environmental regulatory mechanisms, but 
also to reassert the connections between international trade and the 
environment. The international trade regime has been driven by the 
central, overarching goal of liberalizing trade through the systematic 
elimination of affirmative governmental measures such as tariffs. Indeed, 
the history of the international trade regime since the Second W orId 
War can be seen as incremental but persistent progress in extending this 
purpose to include not only tariffs, but export subsidies and non-tariff 
barriers as well. The efficacy of the trade regime can be accounted for 
to a large extent by the simplicity of this central message: less govern-
mental intervention, almost by definition, promotes liberalized trade. By 
contrast, international obligations with respect to the environment, and 
many other areas as well, anticipate and require the implementation of 
affirmative governmental actions intended to address particular prob-
lems. In a microcosm, this explains the recent clash between trade and 
the environment. One regime is designed to facilitate the implementation 
of affirmative governmental measures while the other is intended to 
assure their absence. From the point of view of an environmentally-
motivated standard or regulation, the international trade regime as 
currently ·structured is a no-win proposition. There are no mechanisms 
52. EsTY, supra note 8, at 89-95. 
53. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 270. 
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for assuring the implementation of minimum governmental measures, 
and once those policies that do exist are subjected to trade-based scruti-
ny, nothing more than maintenance of the status quo can be expected in 
even the best possible case. As Esty succinctly puts the problem: 
The GATT currently is asymmetric. It provides for assessments 
that an environmental standard is, in some sense, "too high" and a 
burden on trade flows. But no comparable provision exists to allow 
a determination that an environmental standard is "too low" and is 
burdening other countries with pollution externalities. Such judg-
ments are needed to determine whether a nation is "free riding" 
rather· than participating in efforts to address transboundary or 
global environmental problems and, in doing so, perhaps reducing 
its manufacturing costs and obtaining an unfair trade advantage. 54 
At this point, Vogel enters the colloquy with a provocative and 
perhaps counterintuitive thesis: that trade liberalization, of its own force, 
"has, on balance, contributed to strengthening national regulatory poli-
cies, especially for traded goods and ... for domestic production stan-
dards as well. ,,55 He attributes this to a "California effect": 
named for the state that has been on the cutting edge of environ-
mental regulation, both nationally and globally, for nearly three 
. decades. The California effect refers to the critical role of powerful 
and wealthy "green" political jurisdictions in promoting a regulato-
ry "race to the top" among their trading partners.56 
Ultimately, however, the analysis is disappointing. Although the author 
repeatedly refers to the GATT (now WTO) as a relatively weak institu-
tion by comparison with the United States government or the suprana-
tional EU, he fails to appreciate the important qualitative distinctions. 
The "California effect" arises not from trade liberalization in the 
GATTIWTO sense, but as a result of the affirmative regulatory activity 
characteristic of a higher degree of structural integration than that found 
in most free trade agreements. As Runge would recognize, the "Califor-
nia effect" is dependent on the strength of institutions empowered to 
make environmental rules, not those whose mission is to promote trade 
liberalization in the deregulatory sense. Nowhere is this clearer than in 
Vogel's observation that "[p]aradoxically, the more authority nations 
concede over the making of national regulatory standards, the more 
54. EsTY, supra note 8, at 232. 
55. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 269-70. 
56. [d. at 6. 
HeinOnline -- 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 580 1995-1996
580 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 17:563 
likely these standards will be strengthened.,,57 Put somewhat differently, 
instead of a dilution of regulatory standards catalyzed by trade liberal-
ization, Vogel envisages a "race to the top" led by those jurisdictions 
with higher standards. In cases in which this statement is true, it is not 
paradoxical at all, but a phenomenon entirely to 'be expected. The effect, 
contrary to Vogel's assertion, is not a'result of trade deregulation. Rath-
er, as international institutions acquire more active rule-making powers, 
it is that affirmative authority, not the constraints imposed by trade 
liberalization, that has the capacity to offset the deregulatory effects of 
trade liberalization. 58 
For this reason, the wTO and the EU, not to mention a.true federal 
state like the United States, are not analogous entities because of the 
crucial differences among 'them. To be fair, many of the authors repre-
sented in these books blithely engage in such comparisons' with rela-
tively little appreciation of the profound difference in rules ,governing, 
for instance, the WTO 'on the one hand and the EU on the' other. A 
number of the authors - particularly Vogel, but also Runge - survey 
experiences in the EU, the NAFTA, and the GATTIWTO regime and 
draw comparisons based on them. An entire section of Trade and the 
Environment is entitled "Trade and the Environment in the European 
Community Context." Damien Geradin's detailed analysis in this section 
of the trade-and-environment jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice is most useful on those terms. Alke Schmidt contributes a thor-
ough historical survey of the waste trade under EU law, and John Usher 
acknowledges the important influence of the EU's external obligations, 
such as the Bl;lsel Convention, on the extension of the European Union's 
competence over member states in the area of environmental policy. 
Similarly, Paul Demaret examines the use of trade-related environmental 
measures in the EU's external relations. While these topics are fascinat-
ing and compelling in their own right, the extent to which the lessons 
learned are replicable in other trade-and-environment contexts is far 
from clear. To the extent that the editors of and contributors to Trade 
and the Environment believe that the GATTIWTO regime may have a 
great deal to learn from the EU's experience in settling trade-and-envi-
ronment disputes, considerably more discussion is needed. Unfortunate-
ly, most of the authors leave too many of the potential comparisons 
unexplored. Analogies are provided that do not transfer well from the 
57. [d. at 264. 
58. E.g., Single European Act, 1986 BULL. EUR. COMM. 5, 16-17 (Supp. 2) (adding to 
the Treaty of Rome arts. 130(r-s)~ expressly authorizing affirmative action at EU level with 
respect to environment), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 503. 506 (1986). 
HeinOnline -- 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 581 1995-1996
Spring 1996] Trade and the Environment 581 
GATTIWTO context to the EU:and vice versa, and there is an unfortu-
nate tendency to blur institutional and legal distinctions. Petersmann's 
contributionS9 and Christoph Bail's provocative but all-too-brief piece 
are the most perceptive exceptions to this general rule. 
'Perhaps this says more 'about the inherent .differences between the 
EU and the GATTIWTO regime than it does about the authors' various 
well~intentioned efforts. The EU is a supranational institution, admit-
tedly with limited subject matter jurisdiction or "competence," but 
certainly with the capacity to establish affirmative rules. By comparison, 
the WTO is merely the international equivalent of the "dormant" or 
"negative"commerce clause, hardly the basis for a constitutional struc-
ture comparable to municipal governments or even regional economic 
integration organizations like the EU. Without taking into account these 
critical. differences, it is very difficult to compare these international 
institutions so as to draw meaningful conclusions. Moreover, an appro-
priateanalysis suggests that the real problem in the trade-and-environ-
ment area is not, as· is often argued, loss of national sovereignty, but 
selective cession of sovereignty. , 
Like Runge, many of the contributors to Trade and the Environ-
ment, including Jackson, Esty (in' a contribution to the multiple-author 
volume), and Thomas Schoenbaum, see promising environmental be-
ginnings in NAFfA's treatment of other multilateral environmental 
agreements that employ trade measures, the potential inclusion of envi-
ronmental expertise on dispute settlement panels, investment 
, 
disincentives to discourage the formation of "pollution havens," and the 
exhortation to harmonize up, not down. Much more acutely than most of 
the other authors, Runge appreciates the role of and need for affirmative 
environmental regulation in the context of trade liberalization. Accord-
ingly, he asserts that, in the case of NAFfA, this counterweight was 
provided by the so-called "side agreement. ,,60 . 
Zen Makuch is considerably less impressed with Esty's character-
ization of NAFfA as the "'greenest' trade agreement ever[.]"61 Unlike 
Runge, who regards the. integrity of that instrument as crucial, Makuch 
is highly critical of the NAFf A environmental side agreement. He views 
the institution it establishes, the,CoqImission on Environmental Cooper-
ation, as unable to mitigate or prevent the environmental effects of the 
59. Petersmann, supra note 16, at 150-53. 
60. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 95-96; see generally North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993). 
61. Daniel C. Esty, Making Trade and'Environmental Policies Work Together: Lessons 
from NAFTA, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 373, 379. 
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parent trade agreement due to a series of inherent legal and structural 
weaknesses.62 The Commission's powers, he asserts, are confined to 
identifying and drawing attention to environmental problems.63 Its 
arduous enforcement mechanisms and dispute settlement provisions are 
additionally encumbered by several procedural hurdles whereby two-
thirds of the NAFf A parties must concur before the process may contin-
ue. Public participation, he believes, is limited and all of the Commis-
sion's actions are overseen by the national governments of the NAFfA 
parties.64 Significantly, in light of the emphasis both Runge and Esty 
place upon effective decisionmaking procedures in a WED or OED, 
"[a]ll decisions and recommendations ofthe Council [ofthe Commission, 
comprised of representatives of the three NAFfA parties] shall be taken 
by consensus[.]"6S The Commission may very well be a useful forum for 
the NAFf A parties to address environmental challenges of mutual 
concern. But as Makuch pointedly emphasizes, the NAFf A side agree-
ment, from a structural point of view, is very unlikely to represent the 
sort of institutional progress sufficient to match the rigor of the trade 
disciplines set out in the NAFf A proper. The side agreement assigns to 
the Commission a large number of highly desirable tasks, such as "pol-
lution prevention techniques and strategies," "transboundary and border 
environmental issues, such as the long-range transport of air and marine 
pollutants," and "the environmental implications of goods throughout 
their life cycles.,,66 These mandates, however, are quite open-ended and 
there is no guarantee that concrete progress will be achieved in any of 
these areas. By comparison with the NAFfA proper, which is an edifice 
of binding, enforceable obligations, the side agreement at the time of its 
adoption was, and remains, merely a preliminary blueprint for a structure 
on which construction has yet to commence. 
Of all the authors, Runge perhaps best appreciates the horse trading, 
deal-making nature of the trade agreement negotiation process and its 
implications for the environment. The ultimate trade-and-environment 
linkage is environmental performance as a price of market access. 
Accordingly, he advocates "offering access to markets in lieu of direct 
62. Zen Makuch, The Environmental Implications of the NAFTA Environmental Side 
Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 
387. 
63. Id. at 405. 
64. Id. at 427. 
65. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 60, art. 9, 
para. 6, 32 I.L.M. at 1482, 1485. 
66. Id. art. 10, paras. 2(b), 2(g), 2(m). 
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aid,,67 and "market access ... tied to specific attention in the South to 
environmental protection and improvements, a kind of 'environmental 
conditionality. ",68 These notions are iconoclastic, perhaps particularly so 
for an economist. There is, however, a strong precedent. Precisely this 
kind of linkage was·a centerpiece of the Uruguay Round, in which 
market access was provided in return for improved performance in the 
recognition of intellectual property rights. This "deal" produced for the 
first time a trade agreement, adopted as part of the Uruguay Round, 
containing affirmative requirements for intellectual property protection.69 
While environmental regulation is not precisely analogous to intellectual 
property rights, a potentially replicable precedent has now been estab-
lished that could, at least in principle, provide a'basis for, as Esty advo-
cates, affirmatively "greening the GAIT." , 
The various contributors to Trade and the Environment similarly 
view questions of linkage on a variety of planes. As John Jackson 
writes, "The only questions [sic] is how long the various political pres-
sures for this type of reform will tolerate lack of concrete progress.,,70 
Despite their enthusiasm for improving the ties between the two re-
gimes, many of the authors in this collection urge caution in the devel-
opment of links between environment and trade. For instance, Jackson 
promotes a definitive "interpretation" endorsed by WTO members to 
preserve the environmental protection goals in multilateral environmen-
tal agreements that utilize trade measures. Simultaneously, he is wary of 
eroding the benefits of environmental guidelines such as the polluter-
pays principle by allowing a potential GATTIWTO exemption for envi-
67. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 26. 
68. Id. at 27. The references to foreign aid and conditionality invite analysis of a 
different sort of linkage that has been little appreciated. In recent years, the World Bank and 
other multilateral and bilateral aid donors have increasingly emphasized environment as a 
component of development assistance. To the extent that this "green conditionality" applies to 
exports from the recipient country, the prohibition on process standards in the GATTIWTO 
regime may very well send a conflicting message to recipient countries. Although develop-
ment assistance is increasingly tied to environmental performance, market access is not. 
Indeed, GA TTIWTO rules would affirmatively impede any efforts to coordinate incentives by 
such international institutions as the World Bank and the WTO. As Runge implicitly recog-
nizes, rules governing trade flows are likely to be far more powerful agents of change in 
encouraging improvements in environmental quality than direct aid will ever be. As one of 
his multiplicity of recommendations, Esty proposes a "Green Fund" financed by a 111 ()() of 
one percent tax on trade and capital flows. EsTY, supra note 8, at 239. The performance of 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the extant international institution' most closely 
related to this proposal, has been sufficiently uneven that it would probably be premature to 
replicate that model on the scale envisaged by Esty. 
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-Ale (Dec. 15,1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 
1,4(1994). 
70. Jackson, supra note 36, at 50. 
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ron mental subsidies.71 No fewer than four of the contributions - those 
by Pearce, Jackson, Petersmann, and Cameron and Makuch - recom-
mend clarifying the environmental exceptions contained in Article XX 
of the GATT. 
Institutional issues are treated with a similarly high profile. Writing 
prior to the adoption of the Uruguay Round, Cameron and Halina Ward 
recommend a variety of institutional reforms including increased public 
participation, voting restructuring, and changes to the dispute settlement 
system, few of which were in fact accepted. In particular, their sugges-
tion for the establishment of an Environmental Impact Committee, under 
the auspices of the GA TTfWTO, to assist in the development of a 
methodology to assess the environmental effects of liberalized trade72 
deserves greater attention in the public policy arena than it appears to 
have received. 
III. THE BIG PICTURE 
The task in addressing the trade-and-environment dialectic, accord-
ing to each of these books, is to reconcile the conflict between interna-
tional trade and environmental regimes. The touchstone in each work is 
"balance," a word that appears in the title of two of the four books, and 
the analytical emphasis is on an accommodation between the two fields. 
Esty, whose approach is characteristic o(the other books, repeatedly 
announces that he is searching for a "middle ground,,73 or a "middle 
course."74 Cameron sees in the activities Of a variety of international 
institutions exploring the trade-and-environment relationship "genuine 
hope for the achievement of balance."75 This suggests that what is 
required is compromise or "trade-offs,,76 to achieve a welfare-optimizing 
equilibrium between these two public policy goals. Defining the prob-
lem in this manner inevitably leads to the sort of difficulties and com-
plexities that bamboozle many of these authors when they try to.identify 
unacceptable environmental regulations, establish tests for unilateral 
measures, or parse appropriate institutional roles. There is, however, no 
a 'priori reason to believe that a split-the-difference approach will neces-
71. Id. at 49. 
72. James Cameron & Halina Ward, The Multilateral Trade Organisation: A Revised 
Perspective, in 1 TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 96. 
73. EsTY, supra note 8, at 41. 
74. Id. at 55 . 
. 75. James Cameron, Introduction to 1 ,TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 
14, 14. 
76. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 12. 
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sarily reach a larger truth. More fundamentally, a perspective that treats 
this area merely as a clash of regimes may very well overlook the 
deeper dynamics that gave rise to this conflict in the first place. A single 
earthquake may very well be evidence of great shifts in tectonic plates. 
An alternativ'e approach might avoid asking the question, which 
each of these books does either explicitly or implicitly, whether inter-
national trade is consistent with environmental protection or vice versa. 
Instead, one might consider the role of both international trade and 
environmental protection as embedded in the larger public policy goal of 
encouraging sustainable development. "Sustainable development" was 
the central theme of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), the so-called "Earth Summit" held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992 and attended by more than 100 heads of state and 
government. It was also the theme in the report of the earlier World 
Commission on Environment and Development, a group of twenty-one 
eminent individuals appointed in their personal capacities and chaired by 
Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. Defined as develop-
me"nt that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of f~ture generations to meet their own need~,17 tl;te content of 
"sustainable development" as a concept is somewhat indeterminate. If 
anything is clear, it is that the term is plainly intended as an overarching 
construct that encompasses international trade and environmental protec-
tion, as well as other compartmentalized public policy goals such as 
development assistance. Although all four of these books mention the 
Rio Conference, none, with the possible exception of Cameron and 
Ward in their essay in Trade and the Environment, ascribe to it a central 
role in the trade environment colloquy. Indeed, Vogel treats the event in 
a scant paragraph.78 
From this point of view, one might ask whether certain environmen-
tal protection measures are so inappropriately burdensome that they 
unreasonably interfere with the capacity of present generations to meet 
their own needs. This is one way of interpreting the non-tariff barrier 
problem discussed in Part II above. Similarly, one might identify the 
notion of "sustainable trade" as trade that facilitates the efforts of pres-
ent generations to satisfy their needs while preserving the capacity of 
future generations to meet their own needs. Without further elaboration, 
the concept of "sustainable trade" thus defined is probably not capable 
77. See EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRON-
MENT AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 43-45 (1987). 
78. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 140-41. 
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of precise application as a legal test. It does, however, accommodate the 
relatively elementary notion that some types of trade can encourage 
sustainability, while other kinds of trade might undermine that goal. 
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, one of 
the principal products of the Uruguay Round, refers to "optimal use of 
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development[.]"79 Despite this recitation and the encouragement of 
Cameron and Ward to make the international trading system truly 
supportive of sustainable development,SO the structure of the Uruguay 
Round in larger form and composition is basically the same as the 
GATT and other free trade agreements. That is, the GATTIWTO rules 
are designed to encourage dereguhlted markets through the removal of 
national measures that impede trade: first tariffs, and then other non-
tariff barriers such as environmental regulations that restrict market 
access for beef and gasoline, to choose two recent examples. The 
GATTIWTO system is a regime consisting of primarily "negative" 
obligations in which states agree to refrain from taking actions, such as 
imposing certain tariffs, that could impede market access. For this 
reason, the international trade regime can define sustainability in only 
the most simplistic syllogism: deregulated markets promote trade, trade 
generates wealth, and wealthier countries have more resources to deploy 
for realizing environmental protection and other public welfare goals. 
Runge, the economist, rejects this chain of reasoning, arguing instead 
that "trade rules alone are inadequate to the task: environmental rules 
are also required."St 
Runge's statement is self-evident if one interprets "trade rules" 
strictly as "rules that promote deregulation." Likewise, Vogel states that 
"[t]he greater the commitment to economic integration, the more trade 
agreements will intrude upon domestic policies."s2 This too is only true 
to the extent that "economic integration" is equated with "deregulated 
trade." As a consequence of these and similar outlooks, all of these 
books in essence are confined to discussions of li,mits to deregulation 
because of concern for environmental and public health values. 
79. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Dec. IS, 1993, pmbl. 
para. I, 33 I.L.M. 13, 15 (1994). The name given to the organization during negotiations, 
Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), was changed to World Trade Organization (WTO) at 
the time the agreement was signed. [d. at 13 n.t. 
80. Cameron & Ward, supra note 72, at 103. 
81. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 95; cf Kenneth Arrow et aI., Economic Growth, 
Carrying Capacity. and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE 520 (1995). 
82. VOGEL, supra note 4, at 9. 
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It may be heresy from the point of view of trade policy, but from 
the perspective of sustainability the GATTIWTO's one-size-fits-all 
deregulatory approach may not be appropriate for all trade. It is entirely 
reasonable to ask what kind of trade, on what terms, will minimize 
adverse environmental impacts and encourage environmental conserva-
tion and sustainable development. Runge, for example, compellingly 
argues that protectionist elements in the EU's Common Agricultural 
Policy have exacerbated environmental degradation,83 and that trade 
liberalization in the traditional, deregulatory sense might very well be an 
appropriate policy. response. This may be a situation in which trade 
liberalization can improve environmental quality, maximize social 
utility, and contribute to the imperative for sustainable development by 
discouraging overexploitation or inefficient use of natural resources, 
particularly through the removal of environmentally inappropriate sub-
sidies. 
At the same time, it is by no means apparent that a deregulated or 
unregulated market is sustainable for all forms of international trade. As 
Runge among these authors most clearly recognizes, such a view is 
nothing short of Panglossian. Such international agreements as those 
governing trade in hazardous wastes84 and endangered species85 are most 
certainly trade agreements and arguably "sustainable trade" agreements, 
although clearly not "free trade" agreements as that term is ordinarily 
used. Through this lens, the treatment of multilateral environmental 
agreements, which causes each of the authors to go through complex 
analytical contortions, becomes much simpler. Presumably, these agree-
ments were motivated by a recognition that unrestricted trade in these 
sectors is presumptively unsustainable, that trade presents unusual 
environmental, public health, and trade problems, and that affirmative 
regulation of such trade is therefore required. 
Similarly, the very notion of "sustainable development" raises the 
question whether certain forms of environmental regulation should be 
encouraged by the international trade regime, as opposed to merely 
tolerated. One could imagine a variety of incentives and disincentives -
taxes, subsidies, border fees, standards for imports and exports, con-
sumer information, foreign aid, and expanded market access in return 
for improved environmental performance - crafted so as to encourage 
more environmentally sustainable development. Instead, one of the more 
pressing problems currently in the trade-and-environment area, 
83. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 41. 
84. Basel Convention, supra note 50. 
85. CITES, supra note 49. 
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"ecolabelling" to alert consumers to products manufactured in a more 
environmentally sensitive manner, is emblematic of the manner in which 
international trade rules currently operate. Some of the schemes that 
have caused concern are voluntary as opposed to mandatory, and label-
ling in general, by addressing only the transmission of information, is 
already one of the least burdensome forms of regulation. None of this 
has prevented ecolabelling schemes from becoming a major flash point 
in the current debate.86 
The conventional wisdom is that well-meaning attempts to interfere 
with the free flow of goods in such environmentally sensitive sectors as 
tropical timber will only backfire, exacerbating inefficiencies in the 
allocation of resources. A number of the authors disapprovingly refer to 
Austrian legislation addressing imports of tropical timber.87 Thi~ exam-
ple is particularly noteworthy, because the weakness may have been an 
excessively narrow focus on one aspect of the problem of deforestation, 
namely market access, by one country acting unilaterally. A more com-
prehensive, multilateral undertaking that identified the needs of tropical 
countries and responded with an appropriate mix of rules and incentives, 
as advocated by the economist Edward Barbier: in Trade and the Envi-
ronment,88 might have been more successful. Such an initiative could 
also be a vehicle for addressing overconsumption in industrialized 
countries, a constant refrain voiced by representatives of developing 
country governments as a precondition to their acceptance of additional 
international environmental obligations. ~ut as currently structured, the 
international trade regime also encourages overdependence of the South 
countries on the North's export markets, a phenomenon which tends to 
dampen any serious multilateral effort to address this problem. Tellingly, 
there have been few if any serious attempts to grapple with these ques-
tions in a meaningful way. 
In short, deregulation, the natural endpoint of free trade agreements, 
is not necessarily a vehicle for promoting environmentally sustainable 
development. To the contrary, unregulated markets have generally been 
rejected as a mechanism for pursuing environmental quality improve-
ments. This is the point that Runge makes clearly and forcefully, al-
though in somewhat different words. It is hardly a shocking proposition, 
86. See. e.g., WTO Trade and Environment Committee Agrees on Work Programme in 
Preparation for the Singapore Ministerial Meeting, at 6, WTO Doc. PRESSffE 006 (Dec. 8, 
1995). 
87. EsTY, supra note 8, at 189; VOGEL, supra note 4, at 129-30. 
88. Edward B. Barbier, The Role of Trade Interventions in the Sustainable Management 
of Key Resources: The Cases of African Elephant Ivory and Tropical Timber, in 1 TRADE 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 10, at 436, 450.· 
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as the need for regulatory interventions to respond to market failures has 
been well recognized on the international level for some time. For 
example, a 1972 recommendation of the OECD plainly states that: 
Environmental resources are in general limited and their use in 
production and consumption activities may lead to their deteri-
oration. When the cost of this deterioration is not adequately taken 
into account in the price system, the market fails to reflect the 
scarcity of such resources both at the national and international 
levels. Public measures are thus necessary to reduce pollution and 
to reach a better allocation of resources by ensuring that prices of 
goods depending on the quality and/or quantity of environmental 
resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity and that eco-
nomic agents concerned react accordingly. 89 
"Ensuring t!:tat prices of goods depending on the quality and/or quantity 
of environmental resources reflect more closely their relative scarcity,,90 
is the exhortation, contained in the polluter-pays principle, that encour-
ages cost internalization as at least a first step towar~ assurillg environ-
mental quality. 
Not coincidentally, Esty repeatedly identifies cost internalization as 
one, if not the only, requirement of sufficient generality in the environ-
mental field to act as a counterweight to the basic trade rules specifying 
the most-favored-nation treatment, the requirements for national treat-
ment, and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions.91 Unfortunately, 
Esty does not cariy the insight to its logical conclusion. Cost internaliza-
tion and the polluter-pays 'principle are not only entirely consistent with 
the goals of liberalized trade, but are affirmative mechanisms to "avoid 
distortions in international trade and investment[.],,92 Current 
GA TTIWTO rules allow application of the polluter-pays principle as 
well as implementation of requirements for cost internalization as do-
mestic environmental measures,93 but they do not seem to authorize the 
89. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, Annex 'lI2, OECD Doc. C(72)128 (May 26, 1972), reprinted in ORGANIZATION FOR 
EcON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT 23,24 (1986). 
90. Id. 
91. EsTY, supra note 8, at 38, 176-78,226-27. 
92. Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies, supra note 89, Annex'll 4; see generally David A. Wirth, The International Trade 
Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal States: How Close a Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1389, 1398-401 (1992) . 
. 93. United States - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT Doc. 
U6175, paras. 5.2.3-5.2.7 (June 17, 1987) (discussing polluter-pays principle), in BISD 136 
(34th Supp. 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1601, 1613-14 (1988). 
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enforcement of such standards with respect to environmental effects in 
the country of export. If cost internalization should be a condition prece-
dent to entry into commerce on the national level, the same consider-
ations counsel the adoption of a similar standard for access to the inter-
national marketplace crea~ed by the WTO, instruments and other free 
trade agreements. With an affirmative requirement for cost internaliza-
tion contained in WTO instruments, for example, the international trade 
regime could truly promote sustainable trade and environmental protec-
tion simultaneously. The practical impediments to realizing such a goal 
should not be understated. But as noted above, the door has alr~ady 
been opened to the inclusion of affirmative obligations into trade agree-
ments in the form of intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round. 
To paraphrase Vogel's ultimate conclusion, what would appear to be 
lacking is political will. 
As noted in the foreword to the Runge book, "The final chapters of 
the ongoing trade-environment debate have not been written.,,94 In its 
way, each of these works adds another chapter to that public policy 
discussion by fully engaging the reader, both intellectually and analyti-
cally, in a challenging area where there is much more work still to be 
done. The field is so rich that it is probably unrealistic to expect a fully 
rounded treatment in anyone work. As demonstrated by the wide vari-
ety of backgrounds of these writers, the trade-and-environment area can 
be approached from any number of fields and benefits particularly from 
a multidisciplinary approach. To appreciate the many facets of this gem, 
one should not rely on anyone discipline or, indeed, anyone author. 
94. RUNGE ET AL., supra note 26, at viii. 
